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Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product
as a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability
I. Introduction: A Hazy Area in Products Liability
"[lbo insure that costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves"' is the reason for rendering a manufacturer strict-
ly liable.2 Yet, the manufacturer is not an insurer of his product.8
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 narrows the
-ambit of the manufacturer's liability by requiring that the product
is "expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it was sold."5 The importance of
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
2. For a complete discussion of the policy behind strict liability see Cowan,
Some Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1965); Keeton,
Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693;
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
3. While § 402A is meant to require manufacturers and sellers to bear
much of the responsibility and cost of injuries to consumers resulting from
their defective products, it is not meant to impose upon each manufacturer
and seller an absolute liability as insurer for all injuries to consumers,
regardless of the relation of plaintiff's injuries to the particular defendant's
product.
Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 858 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see Lunt v.
Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 69 Ill.
App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
5. ld. Most courts apply the phrase "substantial change" of § 402A to
alterations made before or after the product reaches the consumer. See, e.g., Franks v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Tex. 1968), aj/'d, 414 F.2d
682 (5th Cir. 1969); Hatcher v. American Motors Corp., 241 So. 2d 147 (Miss.
the substantial change concept is readily apparent. Today products
rarely reach ultimate consumers without passing through several
processing stages. As a result courts continually must determine
whether alterations made after a product left its manufacturer's con-
trol were substantial enough to relieve the manufacturer of liability
for injury caused by the product.6
Despite its importance postmanufacturing modification remains
a hazy area in strict liability.7 Courts have developed various determi-
nations of substantial change and have reached inconsistent decisions.
To introduce a measure of clarity, this comment will first examine
elements considered in determining whether a change is substantial.
Application of the substantial change concept to specific types of
alterations and its procedural effects will then be analyzed. Finally,
the comment will discuss a manufacturer's liability when changes
expected to be made before his product reaches the consumer are not
made.
II. Elements of Substantial Change
The state of the law on what constitutes a substantial change is
in disarray.
The courts do not seem to adopt the same legal theory. Some
place it under ordinary rules of contributory negligence; others
relate it more to the matter of causation of the injuries, while oth-
ers treat it as a question of whether or not the identity of the
product has been preserved.8
The effect of a product's alteration on its manufacturer's liability
arises in causes of action based on negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability in tort.' Courts have failed to distinguish among
these three types of products liability actions. Theories better suited to
negligence or warranty actions have been grafted onto strict liability,
although their concepts of liability are not those of the latter. A more
1970). Contra, Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Bradford v.
Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973).
6. A processor at any stage of production can be relieved of liability for a
product that is substantially changed in a subsequent stage. The scope of this
comment, however, is limited to the liability of a manufacturer in the initial stage of
production.
7. Although much material has been written on strict liability in the past
fifteen years, there are unexplored areas. "In view of the plethora of cases which have
been brought under § 402A, it is surprising that so little has been written on the
subject of § 402A(1)(b), which deals with substantial changes in the condition of the
product.' Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
8. Texas Metal Fabr. Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404 F.2d 921, 924
(10th Cir. 1968).
9. Although the approach to substantial change is similar in these causes of
action, the discussion in this comment is limited to strict liability. For a general
treatment of the effect of alteration on a manufacturer's liability, see R. HutsH & H.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1:13, 1:30 (2d ed. 1974); Annot.,
41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
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logical view, followed herein, is to evaluate how well each theory
achieves the goals of strict liability.1"
A. Change in Identity
The change-in-identity theory assumes that a product modified
to a certain extent ceases to be the same article produced by the
manufacturer. The concept's origins lie in products liability cases
based on breach of warranty. Faced with a trend toward elimination
of privity in warranty actions, courts unwilling to make this change
circumvented the problem by holding that manufacturer's warranties
did not extend to products whose identity had been changed by
subsequent modification.
A typical case is Young v. Aeroil Products Co.,1 a breach of
warranty action in which a construction worker was killed when
thrown from a portable elevator. After noting that the law of warran-
ty was "developing and dynamic," the court found no need to "turn
another comer" by permitting recovery against a manufacturer by one
not in privity. 12 The court emphasized the change the plaintiff's
employer had made to the elevator prior to the accident:
This proof that the purchaser altered the conveyor by adding
to its height and by changing the position of the hitch which
modified the center of gravity, and also that he had had exten-
sive repairs made on the machine after it had twice been dam-
aged indicate that a far different product had been created than
that which was purchased. At the time of the tragic accident the
thing being used was not the thing sold. 13
Because the injury-causing instrumentality differed substantially from
that produced by defendant-manufacturer, the manufacturer was in-
sulated from liability.
14
This same approach was used to bar two strict liability causes of
10. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
11. 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957).
12. Id. at 190.
13. Id.
14. A good example of how courts avoid extension of warranty protection to a
party not in privity is Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d
75 (1955). The court held that carpenters injured by the collapse of wooden ceiling
joists they had made had no cause of action in warranty because
these changes which plaintiffs had made in this piece of lumber were such as
would seem to make it inequitable for the law to treat it as the very same
article which the mill owner sold to the dealer and the dealer sold to the
contractor, when the urge is to extend an exception to the rule which re-
quires privity of contract.
Id. at 660, 288 P.2d at 80.
action in which substantial change was an issue. In Willeford v.
Mayrath'5 a manufacturer of farm elevators that had sent unassem-
bled machines to a retailer was relieved of liability for injuries sus-
tained by a twelve-year-old boy whose foot became entangled in the
elevator drive shaft. The court reasoned that "the machine could not
have been said to have existed while the various parts thereof were in
stock at [the retailer's]. '' 6 Similarly in Walker v. Stauffer Chemical
Corp." a manufacturer of sulfuric acid used in producing drain
cleaner was held not liable for injuries caused by an explosion of the
cleaner. Because the acid's chemical composition and container had
'been altered, the court found that "[t]he ultimate product . . . can
in no way be considered to be one in the same bulk sulfuric acid
... sold to [the drain cleaner manufacturer]."'
8
The change-in-identity theory has questionable validity in war-
ranty law; it has none in strict liability. Although change in identity is
readily apparent when there has been significant alteration, decisions
become more arbitrary when articles have been modified to a lesser
extent. The lack of objective standards may permit a manufacturer to
escape liability for a defective product merely by shipping it in
component parts. 9 This result is clearly inconsistent with the philoso-
phy of consumer protection that underlies strict liability.
B. Causation
Recovery in strict liability requires plaintiff to prove both that
the product was defective2 ° and that the defect caused his injuries."
This burden is increased sharply by an alteration to the injury-causing
product. In addition to establishing a defect attributable to the manu-
facturer, plaintiff must show that the alteration did not break the
causal connection between the defect and the injury.
Whether an alteration broke the causal connection and was itself
the cause of the injury is usually a question of fact,22 except in those
15. 7 IlL. App. 3d 357, 287 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
16. Id. at 361, 287 N.E.2d at 505.
17. 19 Cal. App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1971); see notes 89-94 and
accompanying text infra.
18. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
19. See Willeford v. Mayrath, 7 Ill. App. 3d 357, 366, 287 N.E.2d 502, 508
(1972) (dissenting opinion).
20. See, e.g., Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d
108 (1967); Gutierrey v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. App. 2d 710, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1966); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); McLaughlin
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 N.H. 265, 281 A.2d 587 (1971). See also Note, Proof of
Defect in a Strict Products Liability Case, 22 MAINE L. REV. 189 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Essex Wire Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improv. & Power
Dist., 9 Ariz. App. 295, 451 P.2d 653 (1969); O'Lander v. International Harv. Co.,
260 Ore. 383, 490 P.2d 1002 (1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Eads, 224 Tenn. 473, 457
S.W.2d 28 (1970).
22. See States S.S. Co. v. Stone Mang. Marine Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J.
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rare cases in which the absence of evidence prevents a contrary
finding.13 The standards used by the trier of fact, however, as a basis
for this determination are unclear. As in negligence law the concept
of causation in strict liability is plagued with confusion.24 For exam-
ple, causation can exist at different levels: a product alteration can be
either the sole cause of an injury or a cause contributing to preexisting
defect. In the ten years since adoption of section 402A, a consistent
approach to these two levels of causation has not yet been developed.
1. Injuries Caused Solely by an Alteration.-A manufacturer
is strictly liable for a product that was defective when it left his
control. 25 When no evidence supports the existence of a defect in a
product before its modifications, determining substantial change is
rather simple: the manufacturer is not liable. 26 In Cornette v. Sear-
1973); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Hatcher v.
American Motors Corp., 241 So. 2d 147 (Miss. 1970); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co.,
60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472
P.2d 806 (1970).
23. See Martinez v. Nichols Conv'r & Eng'r, 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1966). See also Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91
Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
24. Many courts in discussing substantial change speak of an alteration as the
proximate cause of an injury. Proximate cause refers to the legal determination of
whether a party should be held liable for an injury to which he contributed in some
way. "Legal cause" perhaps would be a better term. To avoid definitional problems
this comment will employ the word "cause" to mean causation in fact or actual
physical cause. Thus, a defect must have been a necessary antecedent of an injury to
be considered a cause of that injury. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See also RESTATEMENT §§ 430-452; Myers,
Causation and Common Sense, 5 U. MAMI L.Q. 238 (1951); Pound, Causation, 67
YALE L.J. 1 (1957).
25. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment g at 351:
Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where
the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dan-
gerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other cause make it
harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product
was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular
seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced
which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is
not sustained.
Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, however, in-
clude proper packaging, necessary sterilization, and other precautions re-
quired to permit the product to remain safe for a normal length of time
when handled in a normal manner.
26. See Hardy v. Hull Corp., 446 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1971); Speyer, Inc. v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968); Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp.,
370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Martinez v. Nichols Conv'r & Eng'r, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966); Kirby v. General Motors Corp., 10 Ill. App.
3d 92, 293 N.E.2d 345 (1973); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods., Inc., 147 Ind.
App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171
N.W.2d 201 (1969); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d
249
geant Metal Products, Inc.27 plaintiff was injured when a punch press
he was operating malfunctioned. He brought suit against the manu-
facturer of the press' safety control system. Recovery under section
402A was denied because an air filter had been removed from the
press prior to the accident. The court found that the air filter's
removal, contrary to the manufacturer's instructions, could have
caused the malfunction.28 Without evidence of a defect any change
increasing the likelihood of malfunction is a substantial change.2"
When the evidence indicates a preexisting defect, a more diffi-
cult causation problem develops. In Texas Metal Fabricating Co. v.
Northern Gas Products Corp.30 tubes rattled within a heat exchanger
manufactured by defendant. Fearing that loose tubes would cause
excess wear, the owner had holes drilled in the unit and the tubes
bolted against its interior. Gas escaped through one of these holes and
exploded, injuring an employee. In an action against the manufactur-
er the court held that although the alteration had been necessitated by
a defect in the heat exchanger, "this intervening act by the con-
tractor and the owner was clearly shown to be the cause of this ac-
cident and the manufacturer cannot be held liable."'" Thus, a
defective product does not imply automatic liability; it must be caus-
aly connected to the subsequent injury.32
The converse also is true: if the injury was caused solely by an
antecedent defect, an alteration of the product does not bar the
manufacturer's strict liability.33 This situation usually arises when
the modified part is not related to the injury-producing defect. For
example, the court in Dennis v. Ford Motor Co.34 held that addition
of a fifth wheel 5 would not affect a tractor manufacturer's liability
for a defective steering mechanism. Because there was no causal
914 (1974). See also O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968);
Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970);
Rossignal v. Danbury School of Aero., Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967).
27. 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
28. Id. at 54, 258 N.E.2d at 657.
29. Id.
30. 404 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1968).
31. Id. at 925.
32. See also Hatcher v. American Motors Corp., 241 So. 2d 147 (Miss. 1970).
33. See McPhee v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 489 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1974); Dennis
v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Blim v. Newbury Indus., 443 F.2d
1126 (10th Cir. 1971); Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th
Cir. 1969); States S.S. Co. v. Stone Mang. Marine Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J.
1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D Pa 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339
(2d Cir. 1972); Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967),
affd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169
(Miss. 1974); Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970).
34. 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973).
35. A fifth wheel is a coupling in the form of two disks rotating on each other
used in attaching a semitrailer to a tractor. WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTONARY 847 (14th ed. 1961).
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connection between the alteration and the accident, the court upheld
the jury's finding of no substantial change."6 Indeed, even a subse-
quent change closely connected with the defective portion of a prod-
uct may not prevent the manufacturer's liability. In Blim v. Newbury
Industries, Inc.s 7 plaintiff's employer removed mechanical drop bars
from a plastic injector press manufactured by defendant. In finding
for plaintiff the court distinguished Texas Metal: 8
Here the mechanical drop bars were safety features designed
to prevent just such an injury as that sustained by appellee. Since
evidence demonstrated that they were already ineffective, their
removal could not even exacerbate the hazard; a fortiori, it could
not, as a matter of law, constitute a superseding, intervening
cause of injury.39
An alteration with no effect on the occurrence of the injury is
insubstantial.40
The actual cause of an injury is often difficult to determine.
Alterations to a product can obscure the origins of a defect. When a
defect cannot be attributed with certainty to the original manufactur-
ing process or to a subsequent alteration, liability is placed on the
party best able to detect flaws in the product.4 "The question is
essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and preven-
tion of the dangerous aspect is shifted to the intermediate party who is
to make the changes. 42 This test was used in Putensen v. Clay
Adams, Inc.,43 which involved polyethylene tubing purchased by a
hospital. During a heart catherization, a diagnostic procedure in
which radio opaque material is injected into the heart through a tube
inserted in an artery, the tubing kinked, necessitating its removal by
surgery. Quoting comment p of section 402A, -the court held that the
burden of discovery and prevention of the kinking defect had shifted
to defendant-surgeon, who had examined and processed the tubing
36. 471 F.2d at 735.
37. 443 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1971).
38. Texas Metal Fabr. Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404 F.2d 921 (10th
Cir. 1968); see notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
39. 443 F.2d at 1128.
40. See Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969). In Greco an
alteration made to correct a defect attributable to the manufacturer was not substan-
tial because it had no causal connection to the injury.
41. The origin of a defect is especially difficult to determine when raw materials
require further processing to become usable products. See notes 89-94 and accompany-
ing text infra.
42. RESTATEMENT § 402A, conmnent p at 357.
43. 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
for use in the operation. 4 Therefore, the manufacturer was free of
liability.
2. Injuries Caused by Both Defect and Alteration.-The caus-
ation issue becomes most blurred when neither an antecedent defect
nor an alteration is the sole cause of the injury. In these cases the
phrase "superseding cause ' 45 is commonly used. Because this concept
is derived from negligence law, 46 however, its validity in strict liability
is suspect.
Surprisingly, no decisions have applied the concept of supersed-
ing cause to a situation involving concurrent causation of injury. In
each decision discussing superseding cause the defect 47 or the altera-
tion was found to be the sole cause.48 The problem, however, has been
discussed in dicta. In Dennis v. Ford Motor Co. 49 the court stated that
"[a] manufacturer may be insulated from liability for the malfunc-
tion of an instrumentality when a change in the condition of such an
instrumentality causes or significantly contributes to the malfunction
of the instrumentality involved."50 The use of the word "significantly"
in describing superseding cause in strict liability parallels the negli-
gence concept of substantial factor5 and needlessly confuses the two
actions.52
To allow any alteration less than the sole cause of the harm to
supersede the manufacturer's liability is incongruous with the purpose
44. Id. at 1073, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The surgeon made a visual and tactile
examination of the tubing. The tactile examination consisted of running his fingers
along the tube and bending it to test flexibility. The precatherization process included
stretching, cutting, and soaking the tubing. Id. at 1070, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
45. Although some courts use the phrase "intervening superseding cause" rather
than "superseding cause," the terms are interchangeable.
46. In negligence law a superseding cause is defined as "an act of a third person
or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm
to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
RESTATEMENT § 440. For further clarification of the concept of superseding cause see
PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 44.
47. See Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Blim v.
Newbury Indus., Inc., 443 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1971).
48. See Texas Metal Fabr. Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404 F.2d 921
(10th Cir. 1968); Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974).
49. 332 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1971), af 'd, 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 903.
51. See note 44 supra.
52. The validity of using negligence concepts in strict liability was discussed in
Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The court posed
three alternative views. First, because strick liability is not dependent on fault, a
faultless defendant should be relieved of liability by an alteration less significant than
a superseding cause in the negligence sense. Second,
since § 402A liability is designed to be broader than negligence liability,
it would be consistent with the intent of § 402A to require that, for a sub-
stantial change to negate § 402A liability, it must be at least as significant
a break in the chain of causation as an intervening, superseding cause is in
negligence law.
Id. at 857 n.21. Last, the court noted that perhaps courts should find that substantial
change is the sole cause of the injury before the manufacturer is absolved of liability.
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of strict liability. A manufacturer should not escape responsibility for
an accident-causing defect-no matter how small a role it played in
the actual injury-simply because some alteration was a contributing
factor. If a causal connection exists between the injury and a defect
present when the product left the manufacturer's hands, he should be
liable.
This view has been adopted by courts confronted with concur-
rent causes of injury. The reasoning is best illustrated by Wells v.
Webb Machinery Co.5" Plaintiff was injured when the ram of a punch
press descended unexpectedly in midcycle and crushed his hands.
Defective design of the punch press was established: the electrical
circuiting had been designed so that current could flow through the
machine even if a part failed. When plaintiff's employer installed a
defective unit switch, the machine malfunctioned. The court found
the installation of the defective switch to be an insubstantial change.
Defendant-manufacturer contended that its liability was barred by the
alteration and that the defective switch was the sole cause of the
accident.54 Recognizing that the injury would not have occurred
without the defective switch, the court nevertheless imposed liability
on the manufacturer because the "press was unsafe and harmful at
delivery because of its design irrespective of any defective component
part.
'5
To its credit the Wells court did not use the phrase "superseding
cause." When a superseding cause is defined as the sole cause of the
injury, one might ask what is superseded. If no causal connection
exists between the original defect and the injury, a substantial change
does not supersede anything. Much confusion will be prevented if
courts avoid negligence terms and define substantial change as an
alteration that was the sole cause of an injury.
C. Foreseeability
The use of the term "foreseeability" is usually identified with
negligence law. Liability for a negligent act or omission is limited to
foreseeable consequences of that act or omission.56 The term has a
53. 20 111. App. 3d 545, 315 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
54. Id. at 553, 315 N.E.2d at 309.
55. Id. at 553, 315 N.E.2d at 310.
56. The area within which liability is imposed is that which is within the
circle of reasonable foreseeability, using the original point at which the
negligent act was committed or became operative, and thence looking in
every direction as the semi-diameters of the circle, and those injuries which
different meaning, however, in strict liability: 5 foreseeability of a
product's uses establishes the parameters of its manufacturer's respon-
sibility. A manufacturer is liable for all injuries that occur during a
foreseeable use of his product.55
A manufacturer's strict liability also extends to injuries caused
by alterations that he could reasonably anticipate. 59 As long as an
alteration can be anticipated, foreseeability of the manner in which
the injury occurs is unimportant.60 Thus, conversion of a construction
machine from shovel to dragline to crane was held foreseeable since
conversion was contemplated in the machine's design. 6' Similarly,
addition of a grinding wheel to a grinding machine 62 and of a sprayer
to a cleaning fluid container6 3 were considered foreseeable alterations
because they were within the products' intended uses. On the other
hand, when a change is so great that "it [is] then feasible to use the
equipment in a manner different from which would have been expect-
ed from observation of the original design,"64 there can be no finding
of foreseeability.
There is some confusion concerning the interrelationship of
causation and foreseeability in determining substantial change. For
example, the court in Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.65
from this point could or should have been reasonably foreseen, as some-
thing likely to happen, are within the field of liability, while those which,
although foreseeable, were foreseeable only as remote possibilities, those
only slightly probable, are beyond and not within the circle-in all of
which time, place and circumstance play their respective and important
parts.
Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 193 Miss. 421, 428-29, 9 So. 2d 780, 781 (1942). See also
PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 43.
57. See Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1973); cf.
Oehler v. Davis, 223 Pa. Super. 333, 298 A.2d 895 (1972).
58. Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973). To
illustrate the distinction between the negligence and strict liability concepts of
foreseeability, the court gave the following examples:
Mhe manufacturer or seller is not required to foresee, for example, that
a lawnmower-which is designed to cut grass-will be used to cut logs or
cut pipe. Yet, he is required to foresee an injury resulting from a defect,
which injury occurs during the use of the mower for a purpose for which
it was intended, even if the injury did not occur in the particular manner
one might expect. It is to this extent, then, and to this extent only, that
foreseeability enters into the strict liability equation.
Id.
59. D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 120, 125, 310
A.2d 307, 310 (1973); see Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963);
Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970).
60. Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 210, 472 P.2d 806, 811 (1970).
For a discussion of what constitutes an unforeseeable use of a product, see Dale &
Hilton, Use of a Product-When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETI L.J. 350 (1967).
61. Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 333-34 n.15, 319
A.2d 914, 922 n.15 (1974).
62. D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 120, 310 A.2d
307 (1973).
63. Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970).
64. Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974).
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found that "whether a post-delivery alteration in a product is a
superseding cause of harm to a plaintiff may turn on foreseeability as
well as causation in fact."66 To define superseding cause in terms
of foreseeability is erroneous. Foreseeability has no effect on causa-
tion. Rather, it is the means of determining whether liability should
be imposed on a manufacturer even though an alteration was a cause
of the injury. Causation 'and foreseeability are both elements in the
classification of a change as substantial and, as such, should be
determined separately.
The foreseeability approach to substantial change is vital in the
determination of design defects that render a product unsafe in
normal use. 67 If an alteration of a product is foreseeable, its manufac-
turer, who is best able to discover and prevent design inadequacies, is
liable even though the alteration is the direct cause of the injury.68 In
Ford Motor Co. v. Russel & Smith Ford Co.6" the plaintiff was
burned by steam and hot water from a broken radiator hose in a van
manufactured by the defendant. The cause of the accident was the
overburdening of the cooling system by the dealer's installation of an
air conditioner. Because the installation was a reasonable alteration,
responsibility for the defect remained with the manufacturer, who was
held liable for failure to warn7 ° the dealer of dangers inherent in the
cooling system.
71
Anticipated change will not relieve a manufacturer of liability. A
manufacturer must design a product so that foreseeable modifications
will not cause product failure. 72 A manufacturer's liability is not
66. Id. at 333 n.15, 319 A.2d at 922 n.15.
67. Defects caused by the planning for, rather than the manufacturing of, a
product are commonly known as design defects. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 559 (1969). See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
68. The rule is that if the manufacturer or assembler surrenders posses-
sion and control of a product in which change will occur, or in which
change can be anticipated to occur so as to cause a product failure, the
existence of a defect at the vital time is established.
Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
69. 474 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
70. A manufacturer may be liable under § 402A for failure to warn of a
product's inherent dangers. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i at 353; see Noel,
Products Defective Because of Inadequate Direction or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256
(1969).
71. 474 S.W.2d at 558. For further discussion of a manufacturer's liability for
alterations made by an authorized dealer, see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230
Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
72. See notes 25-48 and accompanying text supra.
absolute, however, for he has no responsibility for injuries caused
solely by an unforeseeable modification. 7  A test of substantial
change based on causation and foreseeability best protects an injured
consumer without making the manufacturer an insurer of his pro-
duct.
III. Classification of Changes
The theory of substantial change can be readily understood in
specific fact situations. Because most alterations fall into a limited
number of categories, subtle differences in seemingly similar altera-
tions can be studied to find what makes one change substantial and,
another unimportant.
A. Assembly-Disassembly
The issue of substantial change is not restricted to situations in
which the product has been altered from its original specifications.
Litigation frequently occurs in the area of assembly or replacement
of component parts. Manufacturers commonly ship large industrial
and farm machinery in separate pieces to be assembled by the pur-
chaser. Although there is some authority under the change-in-iden-
tity theory that these manufacturers are insulated from strict liability
because no product existed at the time of shipment, 74 the better view
determines liability on actual causation. 75 As an illustration, in Greco
v. Bucciconi76 defendant manufactured a piler for use in a steel plant.
It was shipped in three parts and assembled on arrival. In a products
liability action for a hand injury caused by a defect in the piler, the
court held that because the machine was not altered upon assembly,
the manufacturer was still liable for injuries caused by the defect.
77
Determining causation and the resulting liability is more difficult
when component machine parts have been replaced or repaired.
When components have been properly replaced with parts produced
by the original manufacturer, an inference arises that the replacement
parts did not cause the injury.78 On the other hand, in a case in which
repairs were made by plaintiff and the replacement parts were not
designed, produced, or sold by the manufacturer, the plaintiff was
barred from a claim in strict liability.79 If an injury-causing defect
attributable to the manufacturer is established, courts that define
73. See notes 45-56 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
76. 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968).
77. Id. at 92.
78. Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1974).
79. Kirby v. General Motors Corp., 10 Ill. App. 3d 92, 293 N.E.2d 345 (1973).
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substantial change in terms of sole causation 80 will hold the manufac-
turer strictly liable even though the replacement of a component part
was a contributing cause.
81
Liability also may extend to a manufacturer of a defective
component part that causes an injury after its incorporation into a
larger product. Comment q of section 402A suggests that "where
there is no change in the component part itself, but it is merely
incorporated into something larger, the strict liability will be found to
carry through to the user or consumer. '82 This suggestion was adopt-
ed in Suvada v. White Motor Co. a8 Plaintiff owned a tractor unit that
collided with a bus when the tractor's brake system failed. In an
indemnification suit against -the truck manufacturer and -the brake
system manufacturer, the Illinois Supreme Court held that strict liabil-
ity applies to the maker of a component part that was not changed
during the installation process.8 4
Removal of machine parts may relieve a manufacturer of strict
liability if the alteration was the actual cause of the injury.8 5 In
Magnusun v. Rupp Manufacturing, Inc."8 a plaintiff injured by an
exposed sparkplug on a snowmobile could not recover from the
manufacturer because the sparkplug cover had been removed. In
Ward v. Hobart Manufacturing Co.8 7 the manufacturer of a meat
grinder was insulated from liability for injuries sustained through the
use of his product because a guard that would have prevented the
accident was removed. The result would have been different, how-
ever, if the guard's presence would not have prevented the harm.88
B. Fabrication from Raw Materials
Determining responsibility for a defect is especially difficult
when raw materials require processing to become usable products.8 9
80. See notes 42-56 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
82. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment q at 558.
83. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
84. Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188; see Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1964); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963);
Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969); City of
Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
But see Goldberg v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
85. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
86. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
87. 317 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Miss. 1973), affd, 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 56-73 and accompanying text supra.
Because of the great change from raw material to final product, the
defect that actually caused an injury is often impossible to pinpoint.
In these cases the liability of the seller of the raw material turns on
"whether the responsibilty for discovery and prevention of the dan-
gerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the
change."90
The two cases that have faced the question of change in raw
material are excellent examples of how the burden of defect discov-
ery and prevention can shift. In Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp."'
the court held that a manufacturer of bulk sulfuric acid was not
strictly liable for injury caused by an explosion of drain cleaner pro-
duced from the acid.
We do not believe it realistically feasible or necessary to the pro-
tection of the public to require the manufacturer and supplier
of a standard chemical ingredient such as bulk sulfuric acid,
not having control over the subequent compounding, packaging
or marketing of an item eventually causing injury to the ultimate
consumer, to bear the responsibility for that injury.
9 2
Responsibility for prevention of the defect clearly lay with the proces-
sor, thus relieving the acid manufacturer of liability. States Steamship
Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine Ltd.9 3 provides a contrast to Walker.
Defendant was a manufacturer of an alloy used in the production of
ship propellers. Certain propellers were found defective and a ship
owner brought suit for property damage. Noting that "a change in the
shape of the product, however noticeable, is not dispositive of the
change issue," the court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment and left the substantial change issue to the jury.94
In States Steamship the alloy was specifically produced for pro-
pellers. The manufacturer was aware of the minimum qualities neces-
sary for adequate propeller strength. On the other hand, the acid in
Walker was not solely for drain cleaners. The acid manufacturer was
unable to determine the eventual characteristics of his product after
its combination with other elements. Thus, in States Steamship the
manufacturer had the best opportunity to prevent propeller defects,
but in Walker that responsibility shifted to an intermediate party, the
drain cleaner producer.
C. Lapse of Time
Lapse of time between the manufacture of a product and injury
90. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment p at 357.
91. 19 Cal. App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1971).
92. Id. at 674, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
93. 371 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1973).




caused thereby is never a substantial change in itself. 9 There is no
rule relieving a manufacturer of liability for a defect after a product
has been used for a certain length of time.9 6 Regardless of how long a
product has been used, the test is the same: Was the product defec-
tively manufactured and was the defect the cause of the injury?
7
Nevertheless, lapse of time is an important circumstance in
determining causation in strict liability.98 Plaintiff's burden of proving
causation increases sharply with the passage of significant periods of
time. 99 After prolonged use of a manufactured article plaintiff is
precluded from relying on an inference that the article was defectively
manufactured. 0 Absent direct evidence of an identifiable defect,
therefore, continuous use over a long period will defeat an action in
strict liability. 10 1
The importance of prolonged use is illustrated by Kuisis v.
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation.°2 Plaintiff was injured by a
load of steel pipe when a brake locking mechanism on the crane from
95. For a complete discussion of the effect of lapse of time on products liability
actions, see Comment, Time Lapse in Products Liability, 4 WILLAMETrE L.J. 394
(1967); L. FRUMER & M. FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 11:03 (1974); Annot.,
54 A.L.R.3d 1079 (1974); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABLITY § 1.13 (2d ed. 1974).
96. Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 65, 68, 301 A.2d
911, 912 (1973) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974). But
cf. Lynch v. International Harv. Co., 60 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1932).
97. Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Ore. 318, 321, 473 P.2d 862, 863
(1970).
98. A prolonged lapse of time between the purchase of a product and an
injury producing accident occupies an extremely vital role in the question
of causation. Even adoption of strict liability, eliminating both the privity
and negligence requirements does not resolve the plaintiff's burden of
proving causation. He still must prove that he received an injury due to a
defect or unsafe condition of the product which was present at the time
of sale.
Comment, Time Lapse in Products Liability, 4 WILLAMETrE L.J. 394 (1967).
99. Dudley v. Bayou Fabr., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 788, 791 (S.D. Alabama 1971).
100. Tracing the defect in the product into the hands of the defendant
confronts the plaintiff with greater difficulties. There is first of all the ques-
tion of lapse of time and long continued use. This in itself is not enough,
even when it has extended over a good many years, to defeat the re-
covery where there is satisfactory proof of an original defect; but when
there is no definite evidence, and it is only a matter of inference from the
fact that something broke or gave way, the continued use prevents the in-
ference that the thing was more probably than not defective when it was
sold.
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 844-45 (1966).
101. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972);
Estabrook v. J.C. Penney Co., 105 Ariz. 302, 464 P.2d 325 (1970); Tuscon Gen.
Hosp. v. Russel, 7 Ariz. App. 193, 437 P.2d 677 (1968); Quirk v. Ross, 257 Ore. 80,
476 P.2d 559 (1970).
102. 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974).
which the pipe was suspended became disengaged. In denying plain-
tiff's claim against the crane manufacturer, the court stated,
The age of an allegedly defective product must be considered
in light of its expected useful life and the stress to which it has
been subjected. In most cases, the weighing of these factors
should be left to the finder of fact. But in certain situations the
prolonged use factor may loom so large as to obscure all others
in a case.' 03
A manufacturer is not liable for defects that arise through a product's
normal wear-and-tear. By producing no evidence of a specific defect
to negate the inference that the accident was caused by "the vicissi-
tudes of over twenty years of rugged use," plaintiff failed to meet his
burden of proof.
10 4
IV. Burden of Proof
"Strict liability eliminates both privity and negligence, but it still
does not prove the plaintiff's case."105 Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving both that the product was defective 0" and that the defect
caused the harm.0 Inherent in this burden is a less obvious require-
ment: plaintiff must show that no substantial change occurred.' 08
A conflict about proof of substantial change exists.' 0 9 Some
courts hold that a prima facie showing of strict liability requires
plaintiff to go foward with evidence of no substantial change or suffer
a directed verdict.' 0 This additional burden is proper in situations in
103. Id. at 336, 319 A.2d at 923.
104. Id. at 335, 319 A.2d at 922. Compare Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974) with Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp.,
256 Ore. 318, 473 P.2d 862 (1970). In a situation factually similar to Kuisis the court
in Tucker held that plaintiff's evidence of a defect in the crane, even though attacked
on cross-examination and by defendant's experts, was enough to overturn the infer-
ence that age and long use of the machine caused the injury. Id. at 321-22, 473 P.2d
863.
105. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791, 840 (1966).
106. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment g at 351.
107. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Southwire v.
Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103
Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake
Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Guglielmo v. Klausner Supply Co., 158
Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969); Rossignal v. Danbury School of Aero., Inc., 154
Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Cornette v. Searieant Metal Prods., Inc., 147 Ind.
App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
109. The phrase "burden of proof" encompasses two separate burdens. One
burden is that of producing evidence satisfactory to the judge of a particular issue in
fact. Failure to meet this burden leads to an adverse ruling, generally a finding or
directed verdict. The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
alleged fact is true. This burden is crucial only if the parties have sustained their
burdens of producing evidence and only when all the evidence has been introduced.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
110. See, e.g., Guglielmo v. Klausner Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608





which a product passes through several hands and comes into plain-
tiff's possession as part of a used machine.111 This requirement has
been misapplied, however, to situations in which alteration is not an
issue. Recovery in strict liability has been denied simply because
plaintiff failed to allege no substantial change."1
2
Recognizing the problems of placing the burden of coming
forward on plaintiff, some courts have shifted that responsibility to
defendant."' This shift avoids the risk of dismissal on technical
grounds." 4 More importantly, this shift acknowledges that substantial
change is often perceived as an issue only by defendant, who is
completely familiar with his product. The court in Southwire v. Beloit
Eastern Corp."5 adopted the shift with the following words:
[A]s a general rule, rather than requiring a plaintiff to negate an
infinite number of possible changes, it seems more reasonable
and in keeping with our adversary process to expect the de-
fendant to allege the substantial changes he expects a plaintiff
to try to disprove."16
As Southwire implied, no matter which party is assigned the
burden of going forward with evidence on the substantial change
issue, the burden of persuasion"' remains on plaintiff. 118 Proof that a
defect caused an injury and proof that no substantial change existed
are opposite sides of the same coin. Failure to prove lack of substan-
tial change is equivalent to failure to prove causation. 119 This burden
of persuasion, on the other hand, does not require plaintiff to disprove
"every possibility conceived by defense counsel's inventive mind. To
require such a burden is tantamount to abolishing his cause of action
"120
V. Nonoccurrence of Expected Change
Comment p of section 402A discusses a manufacturer's liability
when his "product is expected to, and does, undergo further process-
111. Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aero., Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418
(1967).
112. See Guglielmo v. Klausner Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608
(1969).
113. See Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Southwire v.
Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
114. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
115. 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
116. Id. at 857.
117. See note 109 supra.
118. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text supra.
119. Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
120. Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901, 903 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
ing or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and before it
reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer.""' No mention is
made, however, of those situations in which the change a manufactu-
rer expected does not occur. Thus, an important question arises about
a manufacturer's liability for an injury that would have been prevent-
ed by the expected change. Surprisingly, the cases that approach this
question involve either safety guards on punch presses' 22 or safety
controls on hot water heaters.'23 The punch press cases extend liabili-
ty to the manufacturer but the boiler cases do not.
The leading decision absolving a manufacturer of liability when
an expected alteration did not occur is Schipper v. Levitt.'24 Defend-
ant York manufactured water heaters. Levitt, a mass developer of
homes, purchased heating units from York. The heaters were manu-
factured without mixing valves, which are devices used to reduce
domestic water temperature to acceptable levels. Although York in its
instructions strongly recommended their use, Levitt deliberately failed
to install mixing valves. An infant plaintiff, the son of lessees of a
home built by Levitt, was severely scalded by hot water from the
bathroom sink. Suit was brought against both York and Levitt, but
the court held that strict liability applied only to Levitt. 125 In dismiss-
ing the claim against York the court found it impractical for York to
attach mixing valves in the manufacture of its heaters or to require
purchasers to use them.
In the developing steps toward higher consumer and user pro-
tection through higher trade morality and responsibility, the
law should view trade relations realistically rather than mythi-
cally. Thus viewed, it is difficult to see how York could reason-
ably have been expected to do anything other than fill Levitt's
purchase order while expressing its recommendation in clear and
strong terms as it did.'
26
Economic reality also was emphasized in State Stove Manufac-
turing v. Hodges.'27 Failure of a contractor to install the recommend-
ed temperature valve led to an explosion that destroyed plaintiff's
home. As in Schipper the court discovered that "manufacturers of
water heaters commonly do not install such safety appliances, which
are customarily and more conveniently installed by a plumber."'
128
121. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment p at 357.
122. Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 497 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1974);
Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga v. Harris
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); cf. Rios v. Niagra Mach. & Tool
Works, 12 Ill. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973).
123. State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
124. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). A subsidiary of Levitt that acted as
purchasing agent also was joined, but is unimportant to this discussion.
125. Id. at 97, 207 A.2d at 329.
126. Id. at 99, 207 A.2d at 330.
127. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
128. Id. at 122.
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Installation of the heater without a temperature valve, therefore,
constituted a misuse that barred a strict liability claim against the
manufacturer. 
1 2 9
In contrast to Schipper and State Stove are cases concerning the
failure of an intermediate party to install protective devices on punch
presses.13 ° These cases emphasize protection of the user, rather than
realistic trade practices. The leading case is Bexiga v. Havir Manufac-
turing Corp.,"' in which defendant manufactured a punch press
purchased by plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff, who lost the fingers of his
right hand, contended that the machine was unreasonably dangerous
without a device to prevent the ram from descending while the
operator's hand was underneath it. The manufacturer argued the
impracticability of equipping the machine with such a device before
its use was determined. The court held, however, that impracticability
alone will not allow a manufacturer to escape liability.
The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed
demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave
such a critical phase of his manuacturing process to the hap-
hazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be
certain that such devices will be installed on all machines-which
clearly the public interest requires-is to place the duty on the
manufacturer where it is feasible for him to do so. 132
The court concluded that since it was feasible for the manufacturer to
install a safety device, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim in
strict liability. 1 3
Theories espoused by courts do not always indicate the true
motives behind their decisions. The Schipper court could easily speak
in terms of market place realities because "plaintiffs [had] been
afforded wholly adequate protection against Levitt."' 34 Similarly,
plaintiff in State Stove could seek damages from the developer in
negligence, if not from the manufacturer in strict liability. Both courts
restricted applicability of section 402A because of the proximity of a
financially responsible party. When the party who made the alteration
is unavailable, however, the inadequacy of the rationale in the boiler
cases becomes apparent. In Bexiga no intermediate party was before
the court; the factory owner's liability was controlled by workmen's
129. Id; see notes 59-69 and accompanying text supra.
130. Cases cited note 122 supra.
131. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
132. Id. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285.
133. Id. at 411, 290 A.2d at 285.
134. Schipper v. Levitt, 44 N.J. 70, 98, 207 A.2d 314, 329 (1965).
compensation laws.1 5 Under Schipper the fixed amount of work-
men's compensation, thus, would be the total recovery of an injured
party. Moreover, Schipper provides no impetus to a manufacturer to
install safety devices in the future.'" 6 To protect both the injured
party and those who will be exposed to the same dangers, courts
should extend strict liaiblity to the manufacturer.
VI. Conclusion
That substantial change remains a hazy area of products liability
law is surprising in view of the frequency with which the issue has
arisen. Too often courts determine the strict liability of a manufactur-
er for a subsequently altered product by using concepts borrowed
from negligence and warranty law. This approach disregards the
purposes of strict liability. Any causal connection between an injury
and a defect attributable to a manufacturer should extend liability to
the manufacturer. An alteration should be considered a substantial
change only when it is the sole cause of the harm.
ROBERT T. EBERT
135. 86 H-Iv. L. REV. 923, 925 (1973).
136. Id. at 928.
